## **Neural Process Models for Intentional States**

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#### **Motivation**

Spectrums of Dynamic Field Theory

Models capturing psycho-physical data



[Thelen et al., 2001]

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Spectrums of Dynamic Field Theory

- Models capturing psycho-physical data
- Models capturing behavioral competences



#### **Motivation**

Spectrums of Dynamic Field Theory

- Models capturing psycho-physical data
- Models capturing behavioral competences
- Models capturing intentional agents?



The capacity of the nervous system to generate mental states that are "about" things in the world.

"Things in the world" include the agent's body and its mental states

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- How may intentional states emerge from neural processes?

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- How are intentional states stabilized in time?

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- ▶ How may intentional states emerge from neural processes?
- How are intentional states stabilized in time?
- Under which circumstances are intentional states destabilized?

### **Intentional States**

Defined through a content and a psychological mode

#### World-to-Mind Direction of Fit

- > Picking a *red flower* in front of me
- > Pick a *red flower* later in the park
- ▶ Wanting a *red flower*

#### Mind-to-World Direction of Fit

- ► Seeing a *red flower* in front of me
- ▶ Recall a *red flower* growing in the park
- ► *Red flowers* have a green stem

(Intention-in-Action) (Prior Intention) (Desire )

(Perception) (Memory) (Belief)



content

[Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind, Searle, 1983]

### Directions of Fit: Mind-to-World



Example: Perception

## Directions of Fit: Mind-to-World



Example: Perception

### Directions of Fit: World-to-Mind



Example: Intention-in-Action

### Directions of Fit: World-to-Mind



#### Example: Intention-in-Action

## **Directions of Fit: World-to-Mind**



#### Example: Intention-in-Action

**Condition of Satisfaction**: Is the fit achieved?

### A neural Process Model

- Detects CoS based on sensor information
- Represents action initiation and termination
- Drives motor behavior



[Sandamirskaya and Schöner, 2010]















#### Model

# A simple Painting Scenario

- Toy scenario includes six different psychological modes
- Behavior emerges from autonomous transitions between intentional states
- Stabilized intentional states make up experience
- Experience allows the formation of categorical beliefs



[Tekülve and Schöner, 2019]

#### Model

## Mind-To-World States

#### Perception

- See Objects (Position, Height, Color)
- Observe Color Change
- Sense Position, Arm, Paint-Device Status

#### Memory

Objects in World Space

#### Belief

Paint Rules (Coat Color + Canvas Color = Result Color)



#### Model

## World-To-Mind States

#### Intention-in-Action

- ► Move in 1-D Space
- Reach for Objects
- ▶ Pick-Up/Dispense Color
- Invoke certain Mind-to-World States

#### **Prior Intention**

- Locate an Object
- Collect a certain Coat
- Apply Coat on a certain Canvas
- Desire
  - Create a certain Color



## **Architecture Overview**



Sensor/Motor Surface

#### From Sensor to Field



#### **Process Model: Perception**



**No Perception** 

retinal space

#### Perception











## Memory Buildup



### **Example: Goal-Directed Driving**



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## **Example: Goal-Directed Driving**















## **Collecting Sequence**



### **Autonomous Learning**

#### **Requirements:**

- Autonomous action
- Meaningful experience



## **Autonomous Learning**

#### ► Requirements:

- Autonomous action
- Meaningful experience

#### Problems:

- Content abstraction
- Temporal organization



► Learning from a single episode

Learning from a single episode

Coat



Learning from a single episode



Learning from a single episode



Learning from a single episode



- Learning from a single episode
- Cued activation to guide behavior

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Result



- Learning from a single episode
- Cued activation to guide behavior



- Learning from a single episode
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- Learning from a single episode
- Cued activation to guide behavior
- Rejection in the face of conflicting evidence

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## **Belief Recall and Rejection**



### Conclusion

- From sensorimotor surface to abstract representations in continuous time
- Process models of different psychological modes
- Models reveal necessary infrastructure to stabilize learning



#### Conclusion

## Outlook

### **Generalizing Beliefs**



### **Desire Dynamics**



[Aerdker, Feng, Schöner, 2020]

# Thank you for your attention!

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Pre-built apps for: Linux, Mac OS and Windows



## Bibliography

John R Searle, S Willis, et al. Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge university press, 1983.

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